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WHAT IS WRONG WITH SEX IN
AUTHORITY RELATIONS? A STUDY
IN LAW AND SOCIAL THEORY
GALIA SCHNEEBAUM*
Criminalization of Sex within Authority Relations (SAR)—such as sex
in the relationship between a therapist and a patient or an employer and an
employee—is a growing phenomenon. Current theories conceptualize and
consequently justify SAR offenses either under a liberal conception of
sexual autonomy or under a feminist conception of gender inequality. Yet
both conceptualizations are inadequate and fail to capture the
distinctiveness of this new legal category. Specifically, they fail to explain
the main puzzle underlying SAR offenses, which proscribe sexual contact in
the absence of coercion by the offender. Rejecting both liberal and feminist
analytical frameworks, this Article draws on Max Weber’s theory of
authority to suggest that SAR offenders engage in a novel type of abuse of
authority. This abuse involves the overstepping of bureaucratic power into
personal relationships and specifically the use of charisma of the office in
sexual relations. This new conceptualization calls for a reconsideration of
SAR criminalization as sex offenses and paves the way for an alternative
regulation based on the notion of abuse of office, which is fundamentally
understood as anticorruption regulation.

* Assistant Professor, Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) Herzliya, Radzyner Law School. I
am grateful to Shai Lavi for invaluable comments and suggestions. I thank Avinoam Cohen,
Hanoch Dagan, Miri Gur-Arie, Alon Harel, Shelly Kreiczer-Levi, Roy Kreitner, Amit
Pundik, Anat Rosenberg, and Yofi Tirosh for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this
essay.

345

2. SCHNEEBAUM (FINAL TO PRINTER)7/19/2016

346

SCHNEEBAUM

[Vol. 105

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 346
I. THE PUZZLE UNDERLYING SAR OFFENSES ........................................... 349
A. Puzzling Statutes, Puzzling Cases ............................................. 350
1. Medical Treatment and Therapy ......................................... 350
2. Employment and Education ................................................ 353
B. Dissatisfying Theories ............................................................... 357
1. The Liberal Conceptualization ............................................ 358
2. The Feminist Conceptualization ......................................... 363
II. RECONCEPTUALIZING SEXUAL ABUSE IN AUTHORITY RELATIONS ..... 366
A. The Nature of Authority ............................................................ 367
B. Bureaucratic Authority .............................................................. 370
1. Bureaucracy and the Authority of Office ............................ 370
2. Doctors, Employers, and Teachers as Bureaucratic
Authority Figures .............................................................. 373
3. Separate Spheres: The Bureaucratic Sphere and the
Personal Sphere ................................................................. 374
C. What Is Sexual Abuse in Authority Relations? ......................... 374
1. Revisiting the Tayeb Case ................................................... 375
2. Charisma of the Office ........................................................ 376
3. What Is Wrong with Sex in Authority Relations ................ 377
III. NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS................................................................. 379
A. Implications for the Type of Regulation ................................... 379
B. Implications for the Doctrine ..................................................... 381
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................. 384
INTRODUCTION
Consider the cases of a psychologist who pressures his patient into
sexual intercourse; a boss who makes persistent sexual propositions to his
subordinate until she caves in; and a university professor who persuades his
reluctant research student into having sex. In all of these cases, there is a
clear sense of wrong. Less clear is an understanding of the nature of the
wrong, since neither extortion, fraud, nor any other traditional form of
nonconsent under criminal law is involved. This Article offers a new theory
to explain such cases.
Criminalization of sexual contact in relationships between a person of
authority and a person under his authority is a contemporary trend in many
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legal systems, including the United States, Israel,1 Great Britain,2 and
Canada.3 These offenses, which I refer to as Sex in Authority Relations
(SAR) offenses, share a common element: they all proscribe sexual contact
within a certain type of social relationship in which one side holds a
position of power over the other. Notwithstanding this imbalance of power,
SAR offenses do not require an element of force and prohibit seemingly
consensual sexual relations. To be sure, certain SAR cases involve coercive
threats by the authority figure—for example, a workplace supervisor who
threatens to fire an employee if she refuses his sexual advances4 or a high
school principal who threatens to block a student’s graduation if she fails to
meet his sexual demands.5 Other cases involve fraud—for example, a
mental health therapist who falsely represents intercourse as part of
therapy.6 In all of these cases, traditional criminal law doctrines could view
the sex as nonconsensual.7 In many SAR cases, however, physical
aggression is absent and the offender does not make coercive threats or
represent fraudulent claims. Moreover, many SAR provisions disregard the
question of victim consent or even specify that consent is not a defense.8
Thus, two important questions arise: If sex between a workplace
supervisor and an employee or between a therapist and patient is consensual
(or not nonconsensual), on what grounds are these cases criminalized?9
Additionally, what justifies the prohibition, backed by severe criminal

1

American law and Israeli law are extensively addressed in this Article. See infra notes
21–71 and accompanying text.
2
Sexual Offences Act, 2003, c. 42, § 16–24 (U.K.).
3
Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46, § 273(2)(c).
4
See, e.g., Jin v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 310 F.3d 84 (2d Cir. 2002).
5
See, e.g., State v. Thompson, 792 P.2d 1103 (Mont. 1990).
6
See, e.g., Shapiro v. State, 696 So. 2d 1321 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1997); CrimA
7024/93 Eli Falah v. State of Israel 49(1) PD 1 [1995] (Isr.).
7
Criminal law traditionally recognized several categories for the invalidation of
consent—namely, cases where the victim’s outward signaling of consent was not considered
a valid consent by criminal law. These are: incapacity, coercion through threats (extortion),
and deception. For discussion of these categories, see 3 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS
OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO SELF 189–343 (1986).
8
See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE. §12.1-20-06.1 (2012) (“Any person who is or who holds
oneself out to be a therapist and who intentionally has sexual contact, as defined in section
12.1-20-02, with a patient or client during any treatment, consultation, interview, or
examination is guilty of a class C felony. Consent by the complainant is not a defense under
this section.”).
9
The conceptual question addressed in this Article should be distinguished from another
question which I do not discuss here—the mens rea of the offender in SAR cases. I do not
consider mens rea issues but rather discuss a more basic and preliminary question, which
concerns the actus reus and the wrongfulness in SAR offenses.
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punishment, of a consensual sexual affair between mature10 and competent
partners? These are the fundamental questions hovering in the background
of any contemporary analysis of SAR offenses and are the main questions
pursued in this Article.11
At present, SAR laws fall within the jurisdiction of penal regulations—
i.e., criminal offenses or wrongs. While the language of the legislation is
clearly criminal, legal theory lacks a fitting explanation and a proper
justification for SAR offenses. Existing scholarship and jurisprudence
recognize the misfit between SAR and customary categories of
nonconsent.12 One common response, inspired by liberal thought, has been
to cling to the language of nonconsent, using “coerced” consent when
coercive measures were not used,13 or “technical”14 or ungenuine15 consent
when consent was nominally present. Another response, inspired by
feminist thought, abandons the question of consent and describes SAR in
terms of gender exploitation and abuse of power.16
This Article suggests that neither the liberal nor the feminist theory is
best suited to explain SAR offenses, and that neither the language of

10

My analysis focuses on SAR offenses relating to mature victims. Cases involving
minor victims deserve separate consideration and offenses against underage victims are
therefore outside the scope of this Article.
11
This Article is dedicated to the narrower but nevertheless prevalent set of cases that do
not involve threats or fraud. These cases best exemplify the theoretical challenge underlying
SAR. In Part III, I will return to SAR offenses that do involve extortion and fraud, and draw
some broader normative implications that apply to SAR offenses in general.
12
See infra notes 101, 109–112, and accompanying text.
13
See, e.g., Patricia J. Falk, Rape by Fraud and Rape by Coercion, 64 BROOK. L. REV.
39, 79–84, 101–107 (1998).
14
CrimA 9256/04 Yosef Noy v. State of Israel 60(2) IsrSC PD 172, 184 [2005] (Isr.).
The Israeli Supreme Court held that “even if consent was given,” “criminal law, by taking
into account the inferior position of the victim and the imbalance of power between the
parties, treats this consent as merely technical, rather than legally effective.” Id. at 183. This
translation to English and all subsequent extracts from Israeli court decisions is the author’s,
unless otherwise stated.
15
CSA 4790/04 State of Israel v. Ben-Hayim 60(1) PD 257, 268 [2005] (Isr.), translated
in CSA 4790/04 State of Israel v. Ben-Hayim 1 IsrLR 376, 390 [2005] (Isr.). In interpreting
the offense of SAR in employment, the Israeli Supreme Court held that
[The relevant provisions] concern a situation in which consent was apparently given by the
worker to the sexual acts that were committed against him or her. Notwithstanding, the aforesaid
consent was obtained in circumstances in which the supervisor abused his position of authority.
These circumstances give rise to a suspicion, which is based on life experience and common
sense, that notwithstanding the fact that the sexual acts were apparently committed with consent,
this was not a freely given and genuine consent.

Id. at 391.
16
See discussion of feminist conceptualizations of SAR, infra Part I.B.
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nonconsent nor the notion of gender exploitation is adequate for expressing
this new legal category. Rather, the key to understanding SAR offenses is
the concept of abuse of authority. This idiom (or some variation of it, such
as exploitation of authority) already appears in many SAR provisions.17
However, current theories do not dwell on it, nor do they seriously consider
authority or abuse of authority as the conceptual focal point of SAR
offenses. This Article aims to fill this void. It draws on Max Weber’s
account of modern bureaucracy to show that SAR offenses engage a novel
type of abuse of authority, achieved through the overstepping of
bureaucratic power into personal relationships.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I introduces SAR legislation and
case law and describes the crime’s contemporary conceptualization within
legal theory. Part II offers a new conceptualization for SAR offenses, based
on social theory of authority. It introduces a new term—charisma of the
office—and demonstrates its power in analyzing and theorizing SAR
legislation and case law. Finally, Part III outlines the normative
implications of this proposed conceptualization. Most importantly, it notes
that SAR should not be criminalized as a sex offense and a “true crime,” but
rather criminalized as a regulatory offense. The aim of SAR is neither to
vindicate sexual autonomy nor to prevent sex discrimination, but rather to
restrain bureaucratic power and to prevent its expansion into the intimate
lives of individuals. Ultimately, the normative aim of the new
conceptualization of SAR offenses is to circumscribe criminalization and
critique the current expansionist tendencies of both liberal and feminist
theory.
I. THE PUZZLE UNDERLYING SAR OFFENSES
In what follows, I portray the emergence of SAR offenses in two legal
systems (Israel and the United States), review existing theoretical
justifications for these offenses, and point to the puzzle underlying SAR—
namely, the lack of a fitting justification for the criminalization of
seemingly consensual sexual contact. The case law and legislation I present
do not provide an exhaustive survey of American and Israeli SAR
legislation and case law, but rather a selection to serve as basis for the
conceptual analysis hereafter.18 Currently, Israeli and U.S. jurisdictions
17

See, for example, the SAR provision of the Wyoming Criminal Code, which defines
second-degree sexual assault as any case in which “[t]he actor is in a position of authority
over the victim and uses this position of authority to cause the victim to submit.” WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 6-2-303(a)(vi) (2013).
18
The statutes and case law discussed infra cover SAR offenses in the context of
education, employment, and therapy. I have chosen these particular contexts for two main
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provide an excellent laboratory to conduct this inquiry, as both legal
systems contemporarily enforce impressive bodies of law in this area.
American jurisdictions have persistently increased the scope of SAR
legislation,19 and Israeli courts have written pioneering case law in this
field20 that is sure to inform theoretical and practical debates worldwide and
serve any jurisdiction that either has adopted or is considering adopting
SAR regulations.
A. PUZZLING STATUTES, PUZZLING CASES

1. Medical Treatment and Therapy
A growing body of contemporary American legislation criminalizes
sexual contact between patients and their doctors, psychologists, and other
health care providers. According to an exhaustive study published in
1998,21 at least sixteen American jurisdictions have introduced criminal
prohibitions against sexual contact in medical treatment,22 and at least
twenty-two jurisdictions have included criminal prohibitions against sexual
contact between mental health professionals and their patients.23 Since some
of these provisions use fraud or similar terms, 24 criminalization of sex in
medical treatment could be perceived as a mere expansion of the traditional
category of rape by fraud.25 However, the current criminalization of doctor–
reasons. First, education, employment, and therapy represent main targets of SAR
criminalization in Israel and the United States. Second, education, employment, and therapy
are primary locations of bureaucratic authority in the sense that I discuss hereinafter and
serve as basis for the theory I develop regarding charisma of the office. See infra Part II.B.
For a survey of additional areas of criminalization in Israeli and U.S. jurisdictions, such as
clergy, custodial settings, and guardianship, see Galia Schneebaum, Offenses of Sexual
Abuse in Authority Relations: Beyond Liberalism and Radical Feminism (August 2012)
(unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Tel-Aviv University) (on file with author).
19
Susan A. Lentz & Robert H. Chaires, Sexual Assault Statutes Targeting Authority &
Power Imbalances: A Step Forward in Rape Law Reform?, 3 FREEDOM CENTER J. 1, 26
(2011).
20
See discussion of Israeli case law, infra Part I.A.
21
See Falk, supra note 13.
22
Id. at 93.
23
Id. at 96. A more recent study, published in 2011, documents over twenty states’
criminalization of sexual contact in such relationships. See Lentz & Chaires, supra note 19,
at 27.
24
See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3502(a)(3) (2007). The Kansas provision defines as
rape any case in which the victim’s consent to intercourse was obtained “through a knowing
misrepresentation made by the offender that the sexual intercourse was a medically or
therapeutically necessary procedure . . . .”
25
The category of rape by fraud (or deception) is a recognized category of rape in
common law jurisdictions. SANFORD KADISH ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 337–

2. SCHNEEBAUM (FINAL TO PRINTER)7/19/2016

2015]

SEX IN AUTHORITY RELATIONS

351

patient sex extends far beyond the traditional “rape by fraud” cases.
Conventional criminal law concepts no longer capture its essence.
Texas’s legislation, for example, uses an overarching category of “sex
without consent” as its primary definition for sexual assault. This legislation
identifies sexual relations with health care providers as nonconsensual in
cases where “the actor is a mental health services provider or a health care
services provider who causes the other person, who is a patient or former
patient of the actor, to submit or participate by exploiting the other person’s
emotional dependency on the actor.”26 Other jurisdictions specify a per se
rule prohibiting sexual contact during therapy and do not require any
additional elements such as fraud, coercion, or exploitation, as Texas does.
The North Dakota code is illustrative of this point:
Any person who is or who holds oneself out to be a therapist and who intentionally
has sexual contact, as defined in section 12.1-20-02, with a patient or client during
any treatment, consultation, interview, or examination is guilty of a class C felony.
27
Consent by the complainant is not a defense under this section.

Israel has also adopted a criminal prohibition against sexual contact in
therapy.28 Yet even before the Knesset enacted legislation,29 the Israeli
Supreme Court had acknowledged the claim of sexual abuse in medical
relations through expansive interpretations of the offense of rape.30 The
Tayeb case31 is especially interesting for two reasons: first, because the

42 (8th ed. 2007). One subcategory of rape by fraud was traditionally applied to sexual
intercourse under the guise of medical examination. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW
861 (4th ed. 2003).
26
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011(b) (West 2011).
27
N.D. CENT. CODE §12.1-20-06.1 (2012). Idaho provides another example of a per se
prohibition against therapeutic sex. Its code specifies that
[a]ny person acting or holding himself out as a physician, surgeon, dentist, psychotherapist,
chiropractor, nurse or other medical care provider as defined in this section, who engages in an
act of sexual contact with a patient or client, is guilty of sexual exploitation by a medical care
provider. For the purposes of this section, consent of the patient or client receiving medical care
or treatment shall not be a defense.

IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-919(a) (2004). Note that unlike the Texas provision, the word
“exploitation” here does not constitute an independent element of the offense, but merely
appears in the title of the offense.
28
Israel Penal Law, 5737-1977, LSI Special Volume, § 347A (1977). The Israeli offense
is narrower than the Texas legislation, as it applies only to mental health providers and not to
the general medical profession.
29
The Knesset is the Israeli Parliament, which is authorized to enact legislation.
30
See, e.g., CrimA 7024/93 Eli Falah v. State of Israel IsrSC 49(1) PD 2, 15–22 [1995]
(Isr.). Israeli rape law has its origins in the English common law, which became effective in
Israel during the British Mandate (1922–1948).
31
CrimA 115/00 Morris Tayeb v. State of Israel 54(3) PD 289 [2000] (Isr.).
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Court expanded the rape offense beyond its traditional bounds, and second,
because it illustrates the lack of an appropriate legal vocabulary or coherent
justification for the criminalization of SAR.
In Tayeb, a young female patient attended a Jerusalem clinic for
physical therapy for her ankle.32 The patient had three satisfactory
sessions.33 During her fourth visit, the therapist, Morris Tayeb, deviated
from his regular treatment routine. He first asked the complainant if she
suffered pain in her back or neck in addition to her ankle.34 When she
responded in the affirmative, he asked her to take off her shirt and to lie on
the treatment bed.35 He gave her a massage around her back and neck,
occasionally touching her stomach and breasts.36 Then he unbuttoned his
pants and commanded her to perform oral sex.37 To this, the patient quietly
submitted.38 The defendant simultaneously inserted his finger into the
complainant’s vagina.39 A few minutes later, she left the room while Tayeb
stated, “I didn’t force you, did I? These things happen . . . .”40 The
overwhelmed patient uttered, “I forgive you,” and quickly left the room.41
She later filed a complaint with the police, and Tayeb was indicted for
rape.42
The Supreme Court convicted the therapist of rape43 even though
Tayeb did not use physical force, threats, or false pretenses to coerce the
victim into submission. Judge Englard, delivering the majority opinion,
relied on the existing rape statute, particularly those elements that constitute
“lack of consent” due to incompetence.44 Article 345(a)(4) and (5) of
Israel’s Penal Law prohibit sexual intercourse when the woman is unable to
provide free consent either because she is unconscious, mentally ill or
32

Id. at 296.
Id.
34
Id. at 297.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
The defendant told the complainant “suck it, suck it.” Id. at 297.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id. at 298.
41
Id.
42
Id. at 296 (discussing the indictment); id. at 298 (discussing complainant filing the
complaint).
43
Id. at 316. The Supreme Court overruled the trial court’s decision, which acquitted the
defendant from rape and convicted him with a lesser offense, under the Indecent Act. The
Supreme Court actually convicted the defendant of two separate offenses under Israel’s
Penal Law: rape, for the act of inserting his finger into the victim’s vagina, and sodomy, for
the act of inserting his penis into the victim’s mouth.
44
Id. at 313–16.
33
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deficient, or because of any other condition that prevents her from
resisting.45 Traditionally, the “any other condition” provision was applied to
non-enumerated situations that nevertheless involved legal incompetence.
For example, the prohibition had been applied to situations like having
sexual contact with an intoxicated woman.46 In Tayeb, however, the
Supreme Court was willing to interpret the “any other condition” alternative
more leniently. It ruled that while lying on the treatment bed, the patient
was completely unprepared for the defendant’s sexual act.47 Under these
circumstances, the court concluded, the victim’s ability to resist the
defendant was “significantly impaired” to a degree that was enough to
satisfy Article 345 (a)(4).48
While the Court’s judicial acrobatics resonate with the reality of
therapeutic relations, they are insufficient to account for the wrongdoing
involved in SAR cases. Why should we consider a fully conscious and
capable woman incompetent? Some scholars refer to the emotional
vulnerability of patients within the doctor–patient relationship as the core
issue, especially within mental therapy.49 Similarly, the Texas legislation
mentioned above notes a patient’s vulnerability in a doctor–patient
relationship as the potential grounds for criminalization. But why would we
criminalize the abuse of emotional vulnerability? Surely we would not
convict a man who picked up a woman in a bar and had sex with her, even
if she were “emotionally vulnerable” at the time. I argue that SAR offenses
are not concerned merely with dependence, as dependence is inherent in
many human relationships and even in benign interactions, including
marriage. Rather, SAR offenses address a distinct type of relationship and
are concerned with a more specific form of abuse. The current legal system,
however, lacks the conceptual framework to discriminate between these and
other noncriminal behavior.
2. Employment and Education
An analogous development has taken place in the field of employment
and education. Whereas jurisdictions in the United States have taken the

45

Israel Penal Law, 5737-1977, 42 LSI 57, §§ 345(a)(4)–(a)(5) (1987–1988).
CrimA 61/79 State of Israel v. Ploni 33(3) PD 688 [1980] (Isr.).
47
The complainant’s own words are cited in the decision, describing her surprise by the
defendant’s move: “Everything was within seconds, as I said, that was like, other than the
massage which took a long time, this was bang so there was no [sic] really time, I don’t
know.” Tayeb, 54(3) PD at 315.
48
Id.
49
See, e.g., STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX 207 (1998).
46
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lead in criminalizing SAR in medical and therapeutic relationships,50 Israel
has focused on employment relationships.51 In the United States, the
criminalization of sexual abuse in employment is less common,52 but
American feminist scholars have proposed introducing criminal legislation
into the workplace.53 Some U.S. legislators have already taken steps to
criminalize SAR offenses in educational institutions.54
A 1988 provision added to the sex offenses section of the Israeli Penal
Law illustrates the conceptual question raised by new SAR offenses. The
provision proscribes an actor from having intercourse with a woman over
the age of eighteen within employment supervisory relations “by exploiting
[the actor’s] authority in employment or service.”55 This provision
introduces new terminology: “exploitation of authority.” Reading this and
provisions from other jurisdictions,56 we now face the questions of what is
abuse of authority and what is the underlying concept of wrongdoing in
SAR offenses.
50

As I showed supra, several American jurisdictions had taken steps by 1998 to
criminalize SAR in therapeutic relationships, while such an offense was enacted in Israel in
2003. See supra notes 21–23, 28, and accompanying text.
51
The Israeli offense of SAR in employment was enacted in 1988 as part of an extensive
reform to the sex offense chapter of the Penal Law. Israel Penal Law, 5748–1988, 41 LSI 57
(1987–1988).
52
Sexual harassment in employment is treated in American law as a form of (civil) sex
discrimination, often under the Civil Rights Act of 1964. For a survey of American sexual
harassment law, see Katherine M. Franke, What’s Wrong with Sexual Harassment?,
49 STAN. L. REV. 691, 692–98 (1997). One category of sexual harassment is known as “quid
pro quo harassment.” It takes place whenever a workplace supervisor presents sexual
demands and makes submission to them a term or condition of an individual’s employment.
Since quid pro quo harassment involves a supervisor–employee relationship, it overlaps with
certain SAR cases. However, the doctrines of sexual harassment and SAR are different and
have different foci. First, while sexual harassment doctrine focuses on the negative
employment consequences that might follow from sexual noncompliance by the employee,
SAR focuses on a different harm—i.e., the harm involved in the sexual act itself if it does
take place. Secondly, and more profoundly, as I argue infra, while sexual harassment is
concerned with the protection of socially disadvantaged groups from discrimination, SAR is
concerned with the prevention of abuse of authority.
53
Carrie N. Baker, Sexual Extortion: Criminalizing Quid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment,
13 LAW & INEQ. 213, 214 (1995); Michal Buchhandler-Raphael, Criminalizing Coerced
Submission in the Workplace and in the Academy, 19 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 409, 420
(2010).
54
See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.7(b) (2013).
55
Israel Penal Law, 5737-1977, LSI Special Volume, § 346(b) (1977).
56
See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 632-A:2(n) (LexisNexis 2007). Like the Israeli
provision, the New Hampshire provision employs a “use of authority position” wording (“A
person is guilty of the felony of aggravated felonious sexual assault if [he] engages in sexual
penetration with another person . . . [w]hen the actor is in a position of authority over the
victim and uses this authority to coerce the victim to submit . . . .” (emphasis added)).
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In Ben-Hayim, the Israeli Supreme Court attempted to tackle these
questions for the first time.57 A post office manager made sexual advances
to an employee who was twenty years his junior, even at times visiting her
apartment.58 He promised to help her gain permanent employment with the
Israeli Civil Service.59 The employee cooperated with the manager’s sexual
advances, although, as noted by the Court, at times uncomfortably and
apparently without desire.60 As time advanced, she decided to end the
relationship.61 The Court convicted Ben-Hayim of the SAR offense that
prohibited “intercourse by consent.”62
In interpreting the element of “abuse,” the Court began by listing one
obvious example of such exploitation: when the authority explicitly
threatens the subordinate, such as “the making of an open and direct
threat—‘do what I want or I will show you the power of my
authority . . . .’”63 Bearing in mind the nature of supervisory relations within
employment, extortion—the use of illegitimate threats to obtain something
of value out of the victim64—does seem particularly relevant to such
contexts. The very position of a workplace supervisor or an educational
functionary provides him or her with extended access to a multitude of
resources to use to extort sex from a subordinate. However, the Court was
unsatisfied with the use of explicit threats or with extortion as the
exhaustive meaning of abuse. The Court, moreover, did not focus on the
57

CSA 4790/04 State of Israel v. Ben-Hayim, 60(1) PD 257 [2005] (Isr.), translated in
CSA 4790/04 State of Israel v. Ben-Hayim 1 IsrLR 376 [2005] (Isr). The Supreme Court
decided the case as a disciplinary appeal and addressed the criminal provision of SAR as part
of its ruling on the disciplinary charges against Ben-Hayim within the Israeli Civil Service.
However, the case became an authority on the interpretation of the criminal provision of
SAR under the Penal Law. See CrimA 9256/04 Yosef Noy v. State of Israel 60(2) PD 172,
184, 186 [2005] (Isr.) (citing Ben-Hayim throughout and noting the power a person of
authority has over his subordinates).
58
Ben-Hayim, 60(1) PD at 261, translated in Ben-Hayim, 1 IsrLR at 380.
59
Id.
60
Id., translated in Ben-Hayim, 1 IsrLR at 381.
61
Id.
62
Israel Penal Law, 5737-1977, LSI Special Volume, § 346(b) (1977).
63
Ben-Hayim, 60(1) PD at 268, translated in Ben-Hayim, 1 IsrLR at 388.
64
Common law prohibitions against extortion were originally limited to property or to
other pecuniary interests. MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.4. However, in recent years there has
been a growing tendency to extend extortion prohibitions beyond nonpecuniary interests.
See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.5, for an American example of these extortion
prohibitions. See, e.g., Israel Penal Law, 5737-1977, LSI Special Volume, § 428 (1977), for
an Israeli example. Specifically, sexual extortion—the use of illegitimate threats to induce
the victim into having sex—was addressed in the 1960s under the Model Penal Code as
Gross Sexual Imposition, carrying a ten-year imprisonment sentence. MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 213.1(2).
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supervisor’s promise to promote the complainant and did not base its
judgment on a criminal quid pro quo theory.65 Instead, the Court concluded
that “[c]onduct that amounts to an ‘abuse of authority’ may take on many
different guises”66 and that “[i]n any case, the question whether or not the
supervisor abused his power in order to obtain the consent to the sexual acts
will always be examined against the background of the circumstances of the
case and the context in which the acts were committed in each case.”67
The fundamental point in Ben-Hayim is the substantive link between
the element of abuse and the victim of the offense. The Court held that:
In any case, whatever the guise that the element of an ‘abuse of authority’ takes, the
significance is always the same: obtaining the consent of the subordinate to do acts
which he does not really want to do but which he is induced to do as a result of the
abuse of the position of authority68

and in fact endorsed an understanding of SAR under a consent theory.69
While aiming to provide instruction for the future adjudication of SAR
cases, however, the Court was unable to provide clear guidelines for
assessing consent or exploitation in such cases.70 In light of the Israeli
Supreme Court’s judgment, we are left with important questions
unanswered. How can exploitive situations be differentiated from
nonexploitive ones and consensual sex from nonconsensual sex in
employment supervisory relations? If SAR is a new category of sexual
nonconsent, why is the offense titled “forbidden intercourse by consent”?71
65
See Baker, supra note 53, at 230 (advocating the criminalization of sex within
workplace supervisory relationships under a quid pro quo theory, which views such cases as
criminal extortion). Unlike sexual harassment regulation, which proscribes supervisory
threats as well as promises of reward as quid pro quo harassment, criminal law has
traditionally distinguished between threats and offers, proscribing threats as illegitimate
coercion while allowing offers as legitimate bargain. Legal scholars have recently challenged
the traditional distinction by considering certain offers as coercive as well. For a discussion
of “coercive offers,” see ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION 202–21 (1987). The important point
for our present purposes is to note that the Supreme Court in Israel has refused to limit the
meaning of the abuse element in SAR offenses to threats or to offers, and thus has rejected a
quid pro quo understanding of SAR.
66
Ben-Hayim, 60(1) PD at 268, translated in Ben-Hayim, 1 IsrLR at 388.
67
Id. at 270, translated in Ben-Hayim, 1 IsrLR at 391.
68
Id. at 268, translated in Ben-Hayim, I IsrLR at 388.
69
For a similar interpretation of SAR under a consent theory, see, e.g., Scadden v. State,
732 P.2d 1036, 1039–40 (Wyo. 1987).
70
Ben-Hayim, 60(1) PD at 270, translated in Ben-Hayim, 1 IsrLR at 394. The Court does
mention several parameters that may help to determine abuse in future cases, such as the
disparity of forces or the age gap between the parties. However, the judgment points out that
the above factors do not exhaust the different considerations that are relevant to the issue,
and therefore each individual case should be decided according to its circumstances.
71
Israel Penal Law, (5737-1977), LSI Special Volume, § 346(b) (1977).
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B. DISSATISFYING THEORIES

Despite many SAR cases receiving in-depth media coverage,72 legal
scholarship has, so far, paid minimal and sporadic attention to the
underlying theory.73 Moreover, present accounts typically do not
systematically treat SAR offenses as a distinct field. This is indicative of
contemporary SAR theory: the majority of existing scholarship has been
guided by the idea that SAR is another form of nonconsensual sexual
contact. Hence, it considers SAR together with other categories of
nonviolent sexual conduct (such as fraud and extortion) and includes SAR
in the general discussion of the problem of criminalizing nonviolent (and
nonconsensual) sexual conduct.74
72

For an example of Israeli media coverage, see Efrat Weiss, Hebrew University
Professor Suspect for Sexual Involvement with Students in Abuse of Authority, YNET (July
30, 2008, 5:00 PM), http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3575505,00.html, archived at
http://perma.cc/YZD3-ZXNB. For an example of U.S. media coverage, see Paul Richter,
Army Sergeant Gets 25-Year Term for Rapes, L.A. TIMES (May 7, 1997), http://articles.
latimes.com/1997-05-07/news/mn-56313_1_25-year-term, archived at http://perma.cc/WP8
P-WVCQ.
73
American literature is addressed below. See infra notes 87, 91, 95–98, 101–105 and
accompanying text. For Israeli literature, see KOBI VARDI, SEXUAL EXPLOITATION IN
THERAPY (2001) (describing the problem of sexual exploitation in therapy, and examining
various legal means to handle it); Michal Shaked, How Brigadier General Nir Galili Lost
His Chance for Promotion, 9 PLILIM 443 (2000) (offering a narrative reading of a decision
by the High Court of Justice, reviewing the promotion of a brigadier general in the Israeli
Army accused of having a sexual affair with a female subordinate). Shaked’s analysis is
quite unique in the field, for she employs a descriptive rather than a normative methodology.
Instead of advocating some kind of desired reform, her account carefully reads the Galili
opinion, depicts its novelty in setting new standards for amorous relations in the army, and
then tries to assess the deeper cultural meaning of the legal development. Noya Rimalt and
Orit Kamir, two prominent feminist scholars in Israel, did not address SAR extensively in
their writing. Rather, both of them mentioned certain SAR provisions or SAR cases briefly,
mostly in the specific (and limited) context of the Law for the Prevention of Sexual
Harassment. See Noya Rimalt, On Sex, Sexuality and Human Dignity: The Law for the
Prevention of Sexual Harassment in Light of Feminist Theory and Legal Reality,
35 MISHPATIM 601, 627–31 (2005) (analyzing the Galili case from a feminist theory
standpoint); Orit Kamir, Sexual Harassment: Sex Discrimination, or an Injury to Human
Dignity?, 29 MISHPATIM 317 (1998).
74
The problem of criminalizing nonviolent, nonconsensual sexual conduct has become
central to the American deliberation of rape law in the last three decades. The traditional
common law definition of rape required use of physical force. LAFAVE, supra note 25, at 857
(citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *210). In recent years, however, the force
requirement began losing its exclusivity in the definition of rape. Israel eliminated the force
requirement from the definition of rape in 2001. American jurisdictions, on the other hand,
were less willing to divorce the physically-violent model of rape law, and this insistence
gained considerable criticism in American legal literature. SCHULHOFER, supra note 49, at x
(“Sexual misconduct is considered rape only when a man deploys physical force—and often
not even then. Yet consent is far from voluntary when it is given in response to extortionate
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In what follows, I describe existing literature on SAR offenses. These
accounts utilize two distinct terminologies inspired by liberalism and
radical feminism: one includes nonconsent, coercion, and offense-toautonomy; the other, asymmetric power and gender exploitation. While
these terminologies are grounded in well-known theories, current legal
scholarship fails to properly conceptualize SAR as a legal wrong. This has
led commentators and legal practitioners to overlook SAR’s distinctiveness
and to underappreciate the novelty of this legal category. As I show
below,75 an appropriate conceptualization should carry important doctrinal
and punitive implications for SAR regulation.
1. The Liberal Conceptualization
Liberal theory is the dominant theory on modern sex offenses. While
legal regulation of sex dates back to ancient times,76 its establishment in
liberal values is relatively new.77 The transition may be described as
relinquishing a traditional view, where sexual bans were derived primarily
from status (mostly the status of marriage),78 and adopting a modern view,79
viewing individuals, rather than predetermined social status or moralistic
norms, as the sole and final decisionmakers in matters concerning their
sexuality. Through the course of this development, liberal theory emerged.
It considers sexual autonomy80 the underlying value of modern rape law,
and nonconsent81 the primary element of modern rape law doctrine.
threats or the persistent sexual demands of a woman’s doctor, lawyer, or psychiatrist.”);
Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1092 (1986).
75
See infra Part III.
76
For the history of rape law, see SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN,
WOMEN AND RAPE 18 (1975) (describing rape in historical times as a property crime against
the woman’s husband or father). Another important, and very interesting, historiography of
rape law was composed in recent years by Anne Coughlin. Coughlin argues that rape
traditionally served to exonerate women from another accusation—adultery, when sex out of
wedlock constituted a serious offense alongside rape. This, according to Coughlin, explains
why rape victims were required to demonstrate “resistance to the utmost.” Anne M.
Coughlin, Sex and Guilt, 84 VA. L. REV. 1, 14, 30–35 (1998).
77
Jed Rubenfeld, The Riddle of Rape-by-Deception and the Myth of Sexual Autonomy,
122 YALE L.J. 1372, 1381 (2013).
78
And thus marital rape was traditionally exempted from the legal definition of rape. For
an overview of the marital exemption of rape in American law, including its historical
origins at common law, see MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 213.1 (Official Draft
& Revised Comments 1962). For discussion of the marital exemption under Israeli law, see
Yoram Shachar, Lawfully Raped?, 8 IYUNEI MISHPAT 649 (1982).
79
For a description of the evolution of rape law from traditional to modern views in the
United States, see LAFAVE, supra note 25, at 847–50.
80
Stephen Schulhofer offers the most comprehensive theory of sexual autonomy under
American legal scholarship. See SCHULHOFER, supra note 49 (arguing that sexual autonomy
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In this vein, the development of rape law reform and its move beyond
the exclusivity of physical force in rape law is important. As soon as rape
was detached from its origins and came to be acknowledged as a crime
against autonomy, it was no longer evident that physical force, which was
central to the traditional definition of rape (“the carnal knowledge of a
woman forcibly and against her will”82) was still material to the modern
definition of rape. The question, in fact, was even broader than that. If rape
was about sexual autonomy, new questions opened up to the meaning and
proper scope of autonomy, and the variety of circumstances under which,
even without physical coercion, a person’s submission to sex would
adequately qualify as valid consent.83 Specifically, jurists urged expanding
rape law beyond physical coercion to include two main categories of
nonconsensual sex: sex based upon coercive threats and sex through
fraudulent claims.84 These two categories have long been categories of
nonconsent in other legal fields, such as property with “theft by fraud” and
“theft by extortion.” With the liberalization of sex offenses, commentators
called for their recognition within this field as well.
A similar line of thought found certain SAR cases worthy of
criminalization. These accounts suggested that even though SAR offenses

should be viewed as a fundamental legal entitlement deserving the protection of the law just
as other legal entitlements, such as the right to property or to physical security, and testing
the application of sexual autonomy theory in different contexts such as sexual bargaining,
professional authority relations, and more); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Taking Sexual Autonomy
Seriously: Rape Law and Beyond, 11 LAW & PHIL. 35 (1992) (paraphrasing Ronald
Dworkin’s Taking Rights Seriously and offering a theory of sexual autonomy as a distinctive
constituent of personhood and freedom). For additional sources on sexual autonomy, see
Donald A. Dripps, Beyond Rape: An Essay on the Difference Between the Presence of Force
and the Absence of Consent, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1780 (1992) (acknowledging sexual
autonomy as justifying the criminalization of some instances of coercive sex that are short of
physical violence); Dorothy E. Roberts, Rape, Violence, and Women’s Autonomy, 69 CHI.KENT. L. REV. 359 (1993) (developing a theory of sexual autonomy as underlying rape law
and objecting to any sharp distinction between violent and non-violent breach of sexual
autonomy). For a recent critique on sexual autonomy as the underlying value of rape law, see
Rubenfeld, supra note 77.
81
See e.g., ALAN WERTHEIMER, CONSENT TO SEXUAL RELATIONS (2003) (offering an indepth analysis of the concept of consent in sexual relations from a legal, as well as moral,
standpoint).
82
This is the common law definition of rape. LAFAVE, supra note 25, at 857 (citation
omitted) (emphasis added).
83
See Ann T. Spence, A Contract Reading of Rape Law: Redefining Force to Include
Coercion, 37 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 57 (2003) (identifying a need, in contemporary
rape law reform, to define “coercion” beyond physical coercion, and offering to import
contract law conceptions of coercion into rape law to achieve that purpose).
84
See Estrich, supra note 74, at 1120.
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do not always involve physical violence,85 the sex was nevertheless
imposed on the victim, and thus she was forced into having unwanted sex.
Legal literature, case law, and regulations note that while many SAR cases
tell the story of a seemingly consensual sexual encounter—i.e., the
subordinate did not resist, but rather submitted to the authority figure’s
sexual initiatives—submission should not be viewed as valid consent, but
“technical,”86 “tainted,”87 “inauthentic,”88 “flawed,”89 or “coerced”90
consent. Since the balance of power in authority relations may lead
subordinates to accede to unwanted sexual advances made by someone in a
superior position, criminal law, through codifying SAR offenses, steps in to
protect potential victims from wrongful sexual imposition and infringement
of their right to sexual autonomy.91
85

The famous Israeli Katzav case, dealing with sexual charges against the former
president of the state, is, in this respect, atypical since most of the charges included force and
Katzav was ultimately convicted with forcible rape. See CrimA 3372/11 Katzav v. State of
Israel (Nov. 10, 2011), Israel Supreme Court Database (Isr.), available at http://elyon1.court.
gov.il/files/11/720/033/c34/11033720.c34.htm, archived at http://vperma.cc/B2LR-WKYZ.
86
CrimA 9256/04 Yosef Noy v. State of Israel 60(2) PD 172, 184 [2005] (Isr.). The
Israeli Supreme Court held that “even if consent was given”, “criminal law, by taking into
account the inferior position of the victim and the imbalance of power between the parties,
treats this consent as merely technical, rather than legally effective.” Id. (emphasis added).
87
See Schulhofer, supra note 80, at 77–84 (discussing cases of sexual abuse within
professional and institutional authority under the title “tainted consent”).
88
CSA 4790/04 State of Israel v. Ben-Hayim, 60(1) PD 257, 268 [2005] (Isr.), translated
in CSA 4790/04 State of Israel v. Ben-Hayim 1 IsrLR 376, 391 [2005] (Isr). Interpreting the
offense of SAR in employment, the Israeli Supreme Court held that “this offense engages
situations in which the victim allegedly consented to the sexual act” but “since this consent
was achieved through an abuse or in exploitation of a position of authority . . . this gives rise
to a suspicion that consent under such circumstance is in fact not free but inauthentic.” Id.
(emphasis added).
89
“As a general rule, it is inappropriate for the state to limit sexual relations between
consenting adults; in therapy, however, and specifically in mental therapy, consent by the
patient is not real but flawed.” Explanatory Note to the Draft Bill Amending the Penal Law
(Exploitation of Patient’s Dependence in Therapy) (No. 71), 2002, HH 868 (Isr.) (emphasis
added).
90
The wording “coerced consent” appears in American SAR provisions. See, e.g., N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:2(I)(n) (LexisNexis 2007) (“A person is guilty of the felony of
aggravated felonious sexual assault if such person engages in sexual penetration with another
person . . . when the actor is in a position of authority over the victim and uses this authority
to coerce the victim to submit . . . .” (emphasis added)). Similarly, Falk speaks of “coercion”
as including extortion, as well as abuse-of-authority cases. Falk, supra note 13, at 47
(“[R]ape by coercion cases involve the abuse of authority and sexual extortion.” (emphasis
added)).
91
Falk advocates the criminalization of abuse-of-authority cases (and other types of
sexual imposition, such as extortion and fraud) under rape law, since this area of law is
“designed to protect victims’ sexual integrity as well as physical security” and therefore it
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The fundamental problem with the proposition mentioned above is that
it uses the terms “consent” and “coercion” in a rhetorical fashion. Many
SAR cases do not conform to any of the categories of nonconsent
traditionally recognized under common law: incapacity, coercion through
threats (extortion), and fraud. Indeed, as we have seen, certain SAR cases
involve fraud,92 and others involve coercive threats,93 but many SAR cases
and many SAR provisions do not include these elements.94 The typical
scenario described in these cases is of two mature partners who engage in
sexual relations with no explicit threat or fraudulent claims by the offender
and with no expression of nonconsent by the victim.
One proposition, raised in the context of employment, has been to
conceive SAR under a theory of implicit extortion. Stephen Schulhofer—an
American commentator writing within the liberal tradition—considered the
following example. Sally and her boss Bill are working together on a
project late at night.95 When they are about to leave the office, Bill invites
Sally for a drink. Bill’s invitation is not communicated during official
working hours since Sally and Bob were clearly done working that day.
Moreover, it is possible that Sally is attracted to Bill and will be delighted
to have a relationship with him. Yet, claims Schulhofer,
Bill’s seemingly innocent act of asking Sally for a date can pose serious problems. He
has enormous power to affect her career, whether he mentions it or not. And Sally
would know that a decision to turn him down cannot help but color his feelings about
her. So Sally might feel under pressure to accept, whether she really wants to or not.96

Schulhofer, in other words, identifies the potential for abuse as having to do
with the supervisor’s principal control over the employee’s working
conditions. This control is always there, even if the supervisor does not
“threaten” to use it explicitly. The question arises, however, whether

should be expanded “to include a broader range of methods by which sexual predation is
accomplished . . . .” Falk, supra note 13, at 141.
92
See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
93
See, e.g., State v. Thompson, 792 P.2d 1103 (Mont. 1990) (involving a high-school
principal who threatened to block a student’s graduation if she failed to meet his sexual
demands).
94
For my discussion of SAR cases, see supra note 15 and accompanying text (discussing
CSA 4790/04 State of Israel v. Ben-Hayim, IsrSC 60(1) 257 [2005] (Isr.), translated in CSA
4790/04 State of Israel v. Ben-Hayim, 1 IsrLR 376 [205] (Isr.)); supra note 31 and
accompanying text (discussing CrimA 115/00 Morris Tayeb v. State of Israel 54(3) PD 289
[2000] (Isr.)). For my discussion of SAR provisions, see supra notes 26–28 and
accompanying text.
95
SCHULHOFER, supra note 49, at 168.
96
Id. at 168–69.
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“retaliation is an ever present danger”97 may still be understood as
“extortion.”
Technically, it is possible to strain the words “implicit threat” to
encompass the ever-present danger that a workplace supervisor would
retaliate against a subordinate for turning down his sexual advances. This,
however, seems to distort the concept of extortion. Extortion requires
something more than a mere potential for extortion. Even the most subtle,
implicit threat needs, or traditionally was thought to require, something
more than the kind of potential for retaliation that exists in employment
supervisory relations. 98
Current legal accounts do not offer a satisfying theory to explain how
and why consent is invalidated in these cases. Absent such a theory, the
current discourse’s use of the terms coercion and nonconsent is
unconvincing. The mere fact that the victim did not genuinely want sex
does not qualify as proper conceptualization of these offenses. The leap
from assuming unwanted sexual contact to concluding nonconsensual
sexual contact is unfounded. It ends up transforming consent into a
psychological experience,99 which makes significant the victim’s inner will
(or lack thereof) in sexual contact. The long tradition of categories of
nonconsent stands to testify that authenticating will has never been a strong
point of criminal law. People may submit to sexual initiatives for a range of
reasons that do not necessarily reflect their true desire for sex. And these
actions are ordinarily not criminalized as sex offenses.100
Schulhofer seemed to be the most aware of SAR’s unique conceptual
challenges. He sought to anchor SAR in recognized categories of
nonconsent (such as extortion and fraud) but repeatedly pointed to the
irrelevance of these categories for SAR conceptualization. Schulhofer’s
97

Id. at 183.
Schulhofer therefore concludes that traditional coercion or extortion provisions would
not treat the above-mentioned Bob and Sally example as a criminal offense. See id. at 169.
99
The understanding of consent as a psychological phenomenon (also known as the
“subjectivist view of consent”) was defended in recent years by Heidi Hurd and Larry
Alexander. See Heidi M. Hurd, The Moral Magic of Consent, in 2 LEGAL THEORY 121 (Larry
Alexander et al. eds., 1996); Larry Alexander, The Moral Magic of Consent (II), in 2 LEGAL
THEORY, supra, at 165. For a critique of this approach, see WERTHEIMER, supra note 81, at
144–46.
100
Wertheimer discusses an example that illustrates the point. A and B have been dating
for a while but did not have sex until, at some point, A (typically the male) says to B
(typically the female): “[E]ither we have sex, or I’m terminating the relationship.” If B then
gives in to the sexual pressure, she probably (or at least arguably) does not respond out of
true sexual desire; however, criminal law would not tag her submission as nonconsent or
offense to autonomy. In the words of Wertheimer, while “A’s proposal may be wrong, crude,
insensitive,” it is not coercive. WERTHEIMER, supra note 81, at 164–70.
98
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early writings conclude that autonomy “tied to already firm social
understandings” is of no assistance for SAR theory, since existing
conceptions of autonomy do not consider SAR offensive to autonomy.101
However, Schulhofer was more supportive of the view that SAR should be
treated as an offense to autonomy (and possibly even criminalized as such)
in his book, Unwanted Sex, published some years later. The book’s
conclusions advocated criminalization of SAR in mental therapeutic
relations102 and his analysis throughout the book supported the risk to
autonomy in contexts such as employment,103 education,104 and the like. Yet
the book’s overall analysis did not clearly lay out a conceptual basis for
considering SAR a legal offense to autonomy. Whenever he referred to
SAR cases absent extortion and fraud, Schulhofer resorted to a rhetorical
use of autonomy, consent, or freedom of choice.105 His account supposed
that sex in authority relations is often unwanted (as his book title suggests),
but it did not supply a proper reason to invalidate the subordinate’s consent
to sex in authority relations. Furthermore, it did not indicate a reason why
unwanted sex within authority relations should be criminalized, when so
many other cases involving unwanted sex, or not-entirely-authentic desire
for sex, are not criminalized.
2. The Feminist Conceptualization
Another concept of SAR comes from the radical feminist movement.
As opposed to other feminist schools,106 radical feminism directs its
101

Schulhofer, supra note 80, at 83.
SCHULHOFER, supra note 49, at 284 (proposing a Model Criminal Statute for Sexual
Offenses, under which sexual penetration would be punished as sexual abuse, a felony of the
third degree, if the actor engaged in “providing professional treatment, assessment, or
counseling of a mental or emotional illness, symptom, or condition of the victim over a
period concurrent with or substantially contemporaneous with the time when the act of
sexual penetration occurs”).
103
Id. at 183 (“A worker pressured for sex by her boss isn’t completely free to ‘just say
no,’ because retaliation is an ever-present danger, one that existing law does not effectively
deter.”).
104
Id. at 192 (“At the college and graduate school levels, sexual interaction between
students and teachers becomes more frequent, and much of it is directly or indirectly
coercive.”)
105
For example, he writes, “Without explicit threats or other improper inducements,
freedom of choice can still be affected by the distribution of power in particular settings.
Consent can be tainted by constraints that are inherent in relationships between teachers and
students, between job supervisors and their subordinates, and between prison guards and
inmates.” Id. at 112 (emphases added).
106
Feminist thought contains many different schools, but it is common to refer to three
major strands: liberal feminism, cultural feminism, and radical feminism. For a survey of
feminist strands and their practical influence on various law reforms, see Noya Rimalt, On
102
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arguments and critique toward the regulation of sex and profoundly
challenges the principles of liberal thought. It appeared originally—and in
its purest form—in the writings of Catherine MacKinnon. Drawing on neoMarxist ideology, MacKinnon argued that since females in society are
profoundly subject to male domination, it is doubtful that female
submission to sexual demands by males should ever rightfully be viewed as
“consent.”107 Even in the absence of physical force, fraud, or coercive
threats—liberal doctrines that other critics of rape law fought so hard to
apply to the field—MacKinnon argued that it is doubtful female consent to
sex could ever be a meaningful concept under conditions of male
domination.108
Inspired by the challenge posed by radical feminism to the liberal
notion of consent, feminist writers have been attentive to the inadequacy of
consent in considering SAR cases.109 Consequently, they often employ
different terminology for SAR offenses, describing asymmetry or inequality
between sexual partners. Thus, for example, sexual contact in clergy–
Law, Feminism and Social Change: The Example of the Law for the Prevention of Sexual
Harassment, in STUDIES IN LAW, GENDER AND FEMINISM 985 (Daphne Barak-Erez et al. eds.,
2006).
107
CATHARINE MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 178 (1989)
(stating that “[i]f sex is normally something men do to women, the issue is less whether there
was force than whether consent is a meaningful concept”); see also id. at 174 (stating that
“[p]erhaps the wrong of rape has proven so difficult to define because the unquestionable
starting point has been that rape is defined as distinct from intercourse, while for women it is
difficult to distinguish the two under conditions of male dominance”). For other works by
MacKinnon containing earlier versions of these ideas, see Catharine A. MacKinnon,
Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: An Agenda for Theory, 7 SIGNS 515 (1982);
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist
Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635 (1983).
108
Id. In her more recent work, MacKinnon addressed more explicitly the
criminalization of sex under conditions of what she terms “social hierarchy.” CATHARINE
MACKINNON, WOMEN’S LIVES, MEN’S LAWS 244 (2005). Unlike her previous work, here
MacKinnon seems to incorporate an awareness of social hierarchy into a legal conception of
coercion and consent, claiming that “[a]wareness of social hierarchy is absent in the criminal
law of rape[],” and that “rape is a physical attack of a sexual nature under coercive
conditions, and inequalities are coercive conditions.” Id. at 244, 247. However, as
Buchhandler-Raphael rightly observes, MacKinnon does not develop these observations into
a full conceptual framework for justifying the criminalization of sex under conditions of
social hierarchy, nor does she develop the pragmatic implications of these general ideas.
Buchhandler-Raphael, supra note 53, at 411–12.
109
Feminist writers have dedicated little attention to discussing sex in authority relations
as a criminal wrong. MacKinnon’s groundwork theory of sexual harassment includes cases
dealing with sex within supervisory employment relations, but she conceptualized the abuse
as a form of (civil) sex discrimination. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF
WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 4 (1979).
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penitent relationships is described as an abuse of “power dependency
relations”110 and relations between a workplace supervisor and subordinate
is a “disparate power relationship,”111 or simply an abuse of power.112
The feminist language of “asymmetry of power” adds an important
element to understanding SAR. Its advantage over classic liberal language
is that it grounds SAR in some inherent quality of the authority relations,
rather than in the offender’s action. American scholar Martha Chamallas
mentions in her review on Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson113 that “the
existence of an asymmetric relationship alone was enough to constitute
intimidation, even if the supervisor had no specific intent to retaliate against
the noncompliant employee.”114 Seemingly, the language of asymmetry of
power resonates with an awareness felt in SAR cases: namely, that one
party is more powerful than the other and that the relations between the
parties carry a hierarchical nature.
However, the language of “exploitation of asymmetry of power” or of
“abuse of power” is inappropriate for SAR conceptualization. The
terminology of inequality and asymmetry is overinclusive. Inequality is one
of the most complicated, elusive concepts.115 It can be understood in many
ways and fails to explain why, under SAR offenses, only specific contexts
are identified as unequal, rather than conceptualizing sex in every instance
of social or economic inequality as a legally wrong act against the victim.116
110

See Phyllis Coleman, Sex in Power Dependency Relationships: Taking Unfair
Advantage of the “Fair” Sex, 53 ALB. L. REV. 95, 95–96 (1988) (arguing that “sexual
contact occurring within certain human relationships . . . falls on a continuum of a
presumption of exploitation due to what may be called ‘power dependency.’ Specifically,
these relationships include parent–child, psychotherapist–patient, physician–patient, clergy–
penitent, professor–student, attorney–client, and employer–employee.” (citations omitted)).
Coleman’s essay does not address criminal law, but instead treats these cases within a tort
framework. However, her conceptualization of the relationships as “power dependency”
relations and her assumption that consent in these cases is defective are equally relevant to
criminal law.
111
See Martha Chamallas, Consent, Equality, and the Legal Control of Sexual Conduct,
61 S. CAL. L. REV. 777, 805 (1988).
112
Michal Buchhandler-Raphael, Sexual Abuse of Power, 21 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
77 (2010) (proposing to conceptualize and to criminalize various instances of unwanted
sexual relations within professional and institutional settings as sexual abuse of power).
113
Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). Meritor is a leading U.S. case on
sexual harassment, discussing a sexual affair between a workplace supervisor and a
subordinate employee.
114
Chamallas, supra note 111, at 805.
115
See RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE 2 (2000) (pointing out the diversified,
contested, and controversial meaning of equality in political discourse, as well as in
philosophical analyses).
116
Martha Chamallas’s suggestion to neglect consent and move to a standard of

2. SCHNEEBAUM (FINAL TO PRINTER)7/19/2016

366

SCHNEEBAUM

[Vol. 105

SAR offenses relate to authority, implying a notion distinct from gender
domination and more specific than gender inequality. Moreover, at face
value, “asymmetry of power” terms could deem that all sex that occurs
within authority relations is criminal. However, as indicated above,117 many
SAR provisions prohibit only sexual contact that occurs “in abuse” of an
authority position. Missing from the feminist discussion is an understanding
of the natures of authority and its abuse;118 hence, the feminist-inspired
terms of inequality are inadequate.
II. RECONCEPTUALIZING SEXUAL ABUSE IN AUTHORITY RELATIONS
Part I presented the problems with current legal language and theories
used in analyzing and adjudicating SAR. This Part proposes a new theory
for SAR offenses. This theory claims that SAR offenses deal with a distinct
type of abuse of authority—an abuse of a kind of power that I describe for
the first time here. I term this power charisma of the office.119 Charisma of
the office emerges from the modern separation between the professional
sphere and the personal sphere.120 This separation between spheres is
central to modern life and usually does not cause difficulty. Every person
maintains a set of professional connections and a set of personal
“mutuality” in sexual relations as a response to this difficulty is highly contentious. See
Chamallas, supra note 111, at 835–36. Chamallas’s suggestion to move to a standard of
mutuality may invoke criticism, but for present purposes, it is important to see that her
suggestion acknowledges that as soon as we speak of exploitation of an “asymmetry of
power,” we are no longer in the consent court. Instead, we have to adopt some other
language to denote such wrongdoing.
117
See, e.g., Israel Penal Code, (5737-1977), LSI Special Volume, § 346(B) (1977);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 632–A:2(n) (LexisNexis 2007).
118
For a similar critique of the under-consideration of exploitation as a separate element
in sex offenses, see Buchhandler-Raphael, supra note 112, at 138 (mentioning rape law
reforms that “have failed to articulate the exploitation element, viewing the mere potential
for exploitation in sexual relationships as enough to justify criminalization”). BuchhandlerRaphael’s response to this difficulty is to offer an abuse of power model to address sexual
exploitation within arenas of disparate power (such as the workplace and in the academy).
Id. at 132. My analysis suggests that the abuse of power model is a step in the right direction,
but offers a distinct and more rigorous understanding of the power involved, namely, the
power of authority.
119
I use charisma here in a way that is almost the opposite of the common use of this
word. Charisma is usually used in a positive way. I use charisma as generating negative
reactions, such as compliance. I further elaborate my reasons for choosing the term
“charisma” infra subpart II.C.
120
The distinction between a private sphere and public sphere is central to modern
liberal thought. See generally Morton J. Horwitz, The History of the Public/Private
Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1423 (1982) (discussing the history of this distinction). I use
the less common term “professional sphere” and contrast it with the private sphere following
Weber’s analysis of bureaucracy. See infra Part II.B.

2. SCHNEEBAUM (FINAL TO PRINTER)7/19/2016

2015]

SEX IN AUTHORITY RELATIONS

367

connections, and for the most part these connections are separate. SAR
offenses deal with cases in which they are not: cases in which two people
have an authority–subordinate relationship in the professional sphere and
also interact in the personal sphere. SAR offenses are founded on the
concern that the dividing line between the professional and the personal
sphere may be obscured, and that the power held by authority figures in the
professional sphere may extend impermissibly to the personal sphere.
Criminal law has, in effect, recognized charisma of the office as a novel
type of power and is trying to control its abuse. In the following sections, I
use terms borrowed from social theory121—most notably authority,
charisma, and office—to develop this new conceptual framework and then
present it in detail.
A. THE NATURE OF AUTHORITY

Social theory portrays authority as a perplexing phenomenon.122 On
the one hand, it is a type of power that allows some to direct, instruct, and
guide others.123 On the other hand, it is a type of power that does not
employ external means of coercion and does not rely on physical force or
threat of force to its advantage.124 Rather, power is sustained because of the
followers’ belief in the authority’s legitimacy125 and not through physical

121
My analysis infra relies on the theory of authority appearing in Max Weber’s seminal
work Economy and Society. In addition, I refer to Hannah Arendt’s essay on authority (What
Is Authority?) and to some additional observations (on authority) included in her book On
Violence. I further rely on secondary literature on Arendt and Weber, primarily when such
sources help illuminate or expand certain aspects of the original texts that are useful for the
development of SAR theory.
122
See HANNAH ARENDT, ON VIOLENCE 45 (Harcourt, Brace & World 1970) (arguing
that authority is an “elusive . . . phenomen[on]”).
123
Weber considers authority as a specific type of domination, which signifies “the
probability that a command with a given specific content will be obeyed by a given group of
persons.” 1 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 53 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds.,
Ephraim Fischoff et al. trans., University of California Press 1978) (1922).
124
Kronman observes that authority—the most durable form of political power—is not
based on physical compulsion but on a belief in the binding quality of the normative
principles that justify the authoritarian order. ANTHONY KRONMAN, MAX WEBER 39 (1983).
125
“Experience shows that in no instance does domination voluntarily limit itself to the
appeal to material or affectual or ideal motives as basis for its continuance. In addition every
such system attempts to establish and to cultivate a belief in its legitimacy.” WEBER, supra
note 123, at 213 (emphasis added). Commenting on Weber, Kronman observes that “the
hallmark of an authority relationship is the fact that it involves an exercise of power that is
justified in the eyes of the person being dominated because he acknowledges the normative
validity of the principle to which the party wielding power appeals as the warrant for his
actions.” KRONMAN, supra note 124, at 39.
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coercion or verbal persuasion.126 This special characteristic of authority is
vital for conceptualizing SAR offenses, since SAR is an offense even when
the offender does not use coercion.
The first step in understanding authority is recognizing that authority is
fundamentally a social power that not only operates within social relations,
but also originates from society and gains its validity through societal
norms.127 Hence, the exercise of authority is not an exclusive expression of
personal traits (such as charm or physical strength), and in the same
manner, subjection to authority is not an exclusive outcome of individual
weakness or helplessness.128 Indeed, in Scadden, the Wyoming Supreme
Court discussed a recent SAR provision, noting:
[I]t is apparent that the legislature used the word “authority” to mean an externally
granted power, not a self-generated control. One in a position of authority is a person
who acquires that status by virtue of society and its system of laws granting to him the
129
right of control over another.

Therefore, authority is a social power, but two characteristics turn it into a
distinct type of social power. First, authority involves a hierarchical order of
command and obedience: it implies a person in a position of authority who
gives orders and a subordinate who follows these orders.130 The hierarchical
order of authority, moreover, often takes place routinely rather than
126
[A]uthority precludes the use of external means of coercion; where force is used, authority
itself has failed. Authority, on the other hand, is incompatible with persuasion, which
presupposes equality, and works through a process of argumentation . . . . If authority is to be
defined at all, then, it must be in contradistinction to both coercion by force, and persuasion
through arguments.

HANNAH ARENDT, What Is Authority?, in BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE: EIGHT EXERCISES IN
POLITICAL THOUGHT 91, 93 (1958).
127
Weber’s consideration of authority as social order is evident in his introduction of
basic sociological concepts such as social action, sociological relationship, and legitimate
order. WEBER, supra note 123, at 3–62.
128
Weber distinguished between various types of submission in social interaction.
Particularly, he distinguished between submission which is due to individual weakness and
submission to authority:
[P]eople may submit from individual weakness and helplessness because there is no acceptable
alternative. But these considerations are not decisive for the classification of types of
domination. What is important is the fact that in a given case the particular claim to legitimacy is
to a significant degree and according to its type treated as “valid”; that this fact confirms the
position of the persons claiming authority and that it helps to determine the choice of means of
its exercise.

Id. at 214.
129
Scadden v. State, 732 P.2d 1036, 1042 (Wyo. 1987).
130
For Weber’s definition of domination, see WEBER, supra note 123, at 53. See also
Arendt’s definition of the authoritarian relationship as involving “the one who commands
and the one who obeys.” ARENDT, supra note 126, at 93.
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casually. The phrase “authority relations” conveys an enduring reality (a
“relationship”) rather than an isolated episode.131
Second, authority is based on a legitimate belief in the authoritarian
order. Weber thus refers to authority as legitimate domination.132 I shall
soon return to the notion of legitimacy in greater detail. At present, it is
important to note that legitimacy enables authority figures to exercise
power without the actual use of force and without relying on such
advantages as economic superiority. Grounded in legitimacy, authorities
operate without coercion. In fact, as Hannah Arendt observed, the use of
force is often a testimony to the lack of authority: “Since authority always
demands obedience, it is commonly mistaken for some form of power or
violence”; however, she continues, “authority precludes the use of external
means of coercion; where force is used, authority itself has failed.”133
Authority signifies a form of domination, which is distinct from
coercion through force, misuse of economic asymmetries, or exploitation of
individual vulnerabilities. It relies on a hierarchical order of command and
obedience and on a common belief in the legitimacy of that order.134
Weber identifies three types135 of existing authority that differ from
one another in the type of legitimacy upholding them: traditional authority
rests on “an established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions and
the legitimacy of those exercising authority under them”; charismatic
authority rests on “devotion to the exceptional sanctity, heroism or
exemplary character of an individual person, and of the normative patterns
or order revealed or ordained by him”; and rational authority rests “on a
belief in the legality of enacted rules and the right of those elevated to
131
The durability and stability of authority as a specific type of social power is
emphasized in Weber’s account. KRONMAN, supra note 124, at 39 (“Although authority is
merely one form of power, it is, according to Weber, the most stable and enduring form.”).
132
WEBER, supra note 123, at 215.
133
ARENDT, supra note 126, at 92–93.
134
“The authoritarian relationship between the one who commands and the one who
obeys rests neither on common reason nor on the power of the one who commands; what
they have in common is the hierarchy itself, whose rightness and legitimacy both recognize
and where both have their predetermined stable place.” Id. at 93.
135
WEBER, supra note 123, at 215. In accordance with Weber’s methodology, he refers
to those types as ideal types. An ideal type is a methodological tool that is meant to capture
the main characteristics of a given social phenomenon in a non-empirical fashion. For the
methodology of ideal type, see LEWIS A. COSER, MASTERS OF SOCIOLOGICAL THOUGHT:
IDEAS IN HISTORICAL AND SOCIAL CONTEXT 223–24 (1972). In the particular context of the
tripartite classification of authority, Weber mentions that neither of these types of authority
is to be found in historical cases in their pure form, but the consideration of diverse forms of
authority on the basis of sociological, nonempirical terms (“ideal types”) has clear
advantages. WEBER, supra note 123, at 216.
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authority under such rules to issue commands.”136 Weber characterizes the
types according to different historical periods.137 In particular, rational
authority is typical of modern times and traditional authority of premodern
times. Moreover, Weber distinguishes between two different subcategories
of rational authority: legal (rational) authority and bureaucratic (rational)
authority.138 SAR offenses specifically engage bureaucratic authority and
focus on a specific type of abuse—conflation of bureaucratic authority with
charismatic authority.
B. BUREAUCRATIC AUTHORITY

1. Bureaucracy and the Authority of Office
Classic legal thought usually restricts authority to governmental
authority, and the authority referred to is almost invariably the authority of
law.139 Yet new prohibitions on sex in employment, therapeutic, and
educational relationships assume that authority relations exist in a much
broader scope. These prohibitions are not limited to government employers
but also apply to authority positions in the private sector. I therefore use
Weber’s account of bureaucratic authority in modern times to examine
authority positions in the broader sense.
Like other scholars, Weber referred to the authority of modern law as
positive law issued by state institutions.140 He described it as a rational form
of authority with a human source of legitimacy (reason), rather than a
divine or transcendental source.141 In addition to the rule of law and the
136

WEBER, supra note 123, at 215.
On the historical dimension of Weber’s tripartite classification of authority, see KEN
MORRISON, MARX, DURKHEIM, WEBER 362 (2d ed. 2006).
138
Weber thus dedicates separate attention to legal authority and to bureaucratic
authority. His account of legal authority is conducted primarily as part of his sociology of
law. 2 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 641–900 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds.,
Ephraim Fischoff et al. trans., University of California Press 1978) (1922). His account of
bureaucratic authority is conducted as part of the sociology of power and domination.
WEBER, supra note 123, at 212–301.
139
See, e.g., JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW (1979) (offering a moral–
philosophical account of the authority of law and describing the foundations for the legal
system’s claim for authority). For a comprehensive account of the shortcomings of classic
jurisprudence in addressing bureaucratic organizations, see MEIR DAN-COHEN, RIGHTS,
PERSONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS (1986).
140
This understanding of modern law is known as the school of legal positivism. For a
discussion of legal positivism, see Leslie Green, Legal Positivism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHIL. (Fall 2009, Edward N. Zalta (ed.)), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-positivism/
(last visited October 28, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/L8FR-BSDF.
141
According to Weber, traditional forms of authority were religious in essence, while
137
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authority of the state, Weber identified modern authority in bureaucracy, a
basic form of administration that is “the root of the modern Western
state.”142 Weber referred to such authority as bureaucratic and analyzed its
special characteristics.143 According to Weber, bureaucratic authority
connotes authority that is granted to people by virtue of their profession144
or position in an organization’s hierarchy.145 The operation of bureaucratic
authority spans vast social arenas such as the modern workplace (“the
office”) and modern hospitals and clinics.146
In Weberian bureaucracy, individuals receive power based on their
qualifications and professional training. They exercise that power according
to their specialized knowledge.147 Thus, Weber’s understanding of
bureaucracy is not limited to state bureaucracy.148 Accordingly, modern
hospitals and workplaces are bureaucratic whether they are owned by the
government or not. Moreover, under Weber’s account, these institutions are
bureaucratic in a special sense that goes beyond the common connotations
the legitimacy of modern authority rests on its rationality. See supra note 136 and
accompanying text.
142
WEBER, supra note 123, at 223.
143
Id. at 220–26.
144
Weber hardly ever uses the word “professional.” Instead, he refers to the “technical”
or “specialized” training of officials under bureaucracy, which signifies precisely the idea of
professionalism:
The rules which regulate the conduct of an office may be technical rules or norms. In both cases,
if their application is to be fully rational, specialized training is necessary. It is thus normally true
that only a person who has demonstrated an adequate technical training is qualified to be a
member of the administrative staff of such an organized group, and hence only such persons are
eligible for appointment to official positions.

Id. at 218. In addition, Weber mentions that “[b]ureaucratic administration means
fundamentally domination through knowledge.” Id. at 225.
145
Weber often speaks of officials within hierarchical organizations. For example, he
refers to the fact that many bureaucratic organizations follow “the principle of hierarchy; that
is, each lower office is under the control and supervision of a higher one.” Id. at 218.
146
“[B]ureaucracy is found in private clinics, as well as in endowed hospitals . . . .
Bureaucratic organization is well illustrated by the administrative role of the priesthood
(Kaplanokratie) in the modern [Catholic] church . . . .” Id. at 221.
147
Id. at 218. Weber further argues that the systematic operation of bureaucracy
dominates many aspects of modern life. Indeed, according to Weber, almost all areas of
contemporary life function in this manner—capitalistic corporations, the workplace, the
healthcare system, and of course state bureaucracy, which is charged with public services:
“[I]t would be sheer illusion to think for a moment that continuous administrative work can
be carried out in any field except by means of officials working in offices. The whole pattern
of everyday life is cut to fit this framework.” Id. at 223.
148
Weber thus clarifies that as far as bureaucracy is concerned, “the situation is exactly
the same in the field of public administration and in private bureaucratic organizations, such
as the large-scale capitalistic enterprise.” Id. at 222.
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of bureaucracy with complex organization and dysfunction.149 Rather,
modern workplaces, hospitals, and educational institutions are bureaucratic
because they exhibit a distinct type of authority and a unique mode of
interpersonal domination.
Weber adds the term “office,” a delimited sphere of power that is
granted to perform professional enterprises, to enhance his discussion of
bureaucracy. His central idea is that the partition of power into offices
reflects a systematic division of labor,150 and thus authority is accorded for
specific purposes.151 Every office thus embodies a multitude of powers and
prerogatives that, in the normal course of affairs, are used to execute
professional matters in the service of individuals or organizations.
Moreover, an office typically means occupying a tangible space, i.e., a
physical “office” that is distinguishable from the officeholder’s private
residence.152 The word “office” thus simultaneously connotes a sphere of
bureaucratic authority—a professional jurisdiction, if you will—and a
physical space from which an organization or business typically operates.
The different types of legitimacy underlying traditional and rational
authority have important implications for the structure of authority. In
traditional authority, the authority fundamentally belonged to rulers.
Consequently, its power was holistic and permeated the entire existence of
both the rulers and the ruled.153 Domination rested upon “personal devotion
to, and personal authority” of “‘natural’ leaders”154 and the “obligations of
personal obedience” tended to be “essentially unlimited.”155 Contrary to
traditional authority, bureaucratic authority is essentially demarcated and
limited.156 Authority is justified by a rational consideration: the efficient

149
For a discussion of bureaucracy that similarly goes beyond the pejorative
connotations of complexity and dysfunction, see Owen M. Fiss, The Bureaucratization of the
Judiciary, 92 YALE L.J. 1442 (1983).
150
“Each office has a clearly defined sphere of competence,” which has been “marked
off as part of a systematic division of labor.” WEBER, supra note 123, at 218, 220.
151
Weber notes that each office entails a “rationally delimited jurisdiction” and “sphere
of obligations” corresponding to the systematic division of labor. Id. at 218.
152
Weber thus observes the physical separation between “the place in which official
functions are carried out—the ‘office’ in the sense of the premises” and the private domicile
of the officeholder. Id. at 219.
153
Kronman observes that traditional authority is at once religious and economic, and so
traditional authority structures treat both the sacred and the everyday dimensions of social
life as essentially continuous. KRONMAN, supra note 124, at 45.
154
WEBER, supra note 138, at 1117.
155
Id. at 227.
156
Weber thus speaks of the authority of office as a “rationally delimited jurisdiction.”
Id. at 218 (emphasis added).
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administration of society;157 hence, authority is granted to serve specific—
usually professional—purposes. In modern organizations “the person who
obeys authority does so, as it is usually stated, only in his capacity as a
‘member’ of the organization”158 and “there is an obligation to obedience
only within the sphere of the rationally delimited jurisdiction . . . .”159
2. Doctors, Employers, and Teachers as Bureaucratic Authority Figures
Doctors, employers, and teachers exercise bureaucratic authority and
fulfill offices in the sense described above. Workplace supervisors have
power, by virtue of their positions, to determine work conditions, whom to
hire, and whether to promote subordinate employees. Doctors are
empowered, by virtue of their positions, to prescribe medicine and perform
medical procedures on a patient. Teachers and university professors have,
by virtue of their positions, the power to issue grades and to allocate
scholarships. SAR prohibitions thus engage professionals holding
bureaucratic positions of power. Feminists and feminist-inspired
scholarship, whose main interests lie with gender inequality and social
gender categories, have overlooked this important point.
Weber’s analysis of bureaucratic authority reminds us that doctors,
employers, and teachers hold positions of authority under modern
bureaucracies. Legal texts addressing SAR have often mentioned these
powers and spoken of the positions of employers, doctors, and teachers as
positions of power.160 Contemporary legal texts suggest that these powers
offer a means to extort sex161 and occasionally understand SAR under a
paradigm of explicit or implicit extortion. In what follows, I suggest that
157
Experience tends universally to show that the purely bureaucratic type of administrative
organization—that is, the monocratic variety of bureaucracy—is, from a purely technical point of
view, capable of attaining the highest degree of efficiency . . . . It is superior to any other form in
precision, in stability, in the stringency of its discipline, and in its reliability . . . . It is finally
superior both in intensive efficiency and in the scope of its operations, and is formally capable of
application to all kinds of administrative tasks.

...
[T]he needs of mass administration make it today completely indispensable.

Id. at 223.
158
Id. at 217.
159
Id. at 218.
160
See, e.g., CrimA 9256/04 Yosef Noy v. State of Israel IsrSC 60(2) 172, 184 (Isr.)
(while adjudicating a SAR criminal case, the Israeli Supreme Court observed that “[in
criminalizing SAR] the legislature sought to prevent those who hold positions of power and
authority over other people—be them workplace supervisors, army commanders, therapists,
or others who hold positions of authority—from abusing their position of authority . . .”).
161
See, e.g., SCHULHOFER, supra note 49, at 234 (“The doctor may abuse his power, for
example by threatening to withhold drugs the patient badly needs.”).
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SAR is concerned not with these powers but with a charismatic abuse of the
powers of office.
3. Separate Spheres: The Bureaucratic Sphere and the Personal Sphere
A consequent implication of rationalization of authority in modern
times is the demarcation of authority to one sphere and the separation
between the sphere of authority and “private life.”162 While historically
there was an “undifferentiated continuity” between official and private life,
modernity requires a sharp division between the two domains. 163 In modern
times, there is a primary separation between the bureaucratic sphere, the
sphere of authority, and the private sphere, in which hierarchy and
domination are undesirable. People who are authority figures in their
professional lives—i.e., in the clinic or in the office—are not supposed to
have power or authority over others in their private lives. In the privacy of
their own lives (say, when they meet friends), they are equal—or are
supposed to be equal—to everyone else. This reality of separate spheres,
and the difficulty individuals have adopting its artificial circumstances, is
the heart of the problem to which SAR regulation responds. SAR
regulations assume that sexual relations should fall into the private—not the
bureaucratic—sphere, and thus that they should not carry authority or
power from the bureaucratic sphere.164
C. WHAT IS SEXUAL ABUSE IN AUTHORITY RELATIONS?

We have reached the stage to answer the puzzle of SAR offenses:
namely, what motivates the criminalization and adjudication of sex within
authority relations? The basic SAR scenario is a sexual encounter within the
context of a professional relationship. Yet what is wrong with this
combination? While an amorous relationship could interfere with the proper
professional functioning of those involved and is not a new quandary,165 it
162

I mean “private life” here in the everyday sense of the word: life when one is by
herself or with family or friends, and is not engaged in professional activities.
163
KRONMAN, supra note 124, at 47.
164
The concept of spheres and its application in the field of social and legal policy are
not new. See, e.g., MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND
EQUALITY (1983) (conceptualizing society as comprised of several distinct spheres of
activity, such as money and commodity, office, and political power, and advocating an ideal
of complex equality, by which power from one sphere should be restrained from dominating
other spheres). The specific use of bureaucratic sphere, its application to SAR, and the
assertions regarding desired equality in these situations are mine.
165
Professional codes of conduct have long proscribed sex between doctors and patients
as professional misconduct: “The ban on physician–patient sexual contact is based on the
recognition that such contact jeopardizes patients’ medical care.” Council on Ethical and
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is not the crux of SAR offenses. These offenses, unlike professional rules of
conduct, are not concerned with the influence of sex on professional
treatment, but rather the influence of professional relationships on intimate
relationships. SAR offenses are concerned with individuals and their abuse
by professional authority figures. Our mission is to explain why and how.
At the heart of SAR criminalization is a novel type of power: one
derived from the office that extends into personal matters—where it has no
place being. I term this new power charisma of the office. Legislators and
courts are, even if they lack the proper language to realize it themselves,
trying to limit this new power, making sure the powers vested in a
bureaucratic office do not overstep the office’s bounds and influence
subordinates’ private lives. The following subsections expand and clarify
these concepts and show their power in analyzing SAR offenses and cases.
1. Revisiting the Tayeb Case
I return to Tayeb, the Israeli Supreme Court case involving a patient
and her physical therapist.166 Evident in the case is the therapist’s power
over the patient, but the nature of the power is unclear. Even if the Court’s
attempts to verbalize this power were lacking, it is evident that the Court
found that Tayeb had power over the patient and that the sexual act was
wrongful. Without finding the correct language, the Court resorted to the
complainant’s testimony:
I just submitted to every word he said. I thought, well if ever I was in a situation like
that, I would know what to do, but I was like I came under his authority, I came under
his submission. I didn’t fight, I just did what he said.
....
[H]is voice was very authoritative and strong, and I just came under what he had to
say.
....
Like if you say to a little child, ‘do this’, they do that, that is exactly how I was.

167

Interestingly, the complainant’s attempt to explain what happened to
her reflects the very same embarrassment that informs the entire legal field:
how to explain sexual submission in the absence of true desire on the one
hand and the absence of overt coercion on the other hand. But while the
Judicial Affairs, Sexual Misconduct in the Practice of Medicine, CJA Report A—I-90 Am.
Med. Ass’n 1 (1990).
166
CrimA 115/00 Morris Tayeb v. State of Israel 54(3) PD 289 [2000] (Isr.).
167
The complainant, a tourist from Australia, gave her testimony in English and
appeared as is in the Court’s protocol. Id. at 315 (citations omitted).
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complainant is disappointed by her own passivity (“I didn’t fight”), her
testimony implies something other than mere helplessness. It indicates,
rather, a submission to authority (“I came under his authority”). I contend
that the underlying assumption of the Court’s judgment is that Tayeb
possessed, as part of his professional status, a power to make patients
follow his orders and that the complainant’s sexual submission took place
as part of this habituation. The Court concluded that the complainant’s
submission to her therapist did not reflect “free choice.”168 I argue that this
conclusion reflects a fundamental perception of the complainant’s
submission as subservient compliance within an authority relation.
Attentive now to the insights drawn from social theory of authority, we
can better understand the Court’s intuition and why the Court considered
the complainant’s behavior compliance. The categorization of doctor–
patient relations as authority relations makes sense to anyone who has been
party to such relations and has experienced their hierarchical nature. Using
Arendt’s vocabulary, such relations involve a hierarchy between “the one
who commands and the one who obeys.”169 Such a hierarchy was embedded
in the relationship between Tayeb and his patient. It is the fundamental
parameter underlying our “gut feeling” that Tayeb was more powerful than
the complainant and that sex between the parties was wrongful.
2. Charisma of the Office
Hierarchy in itself, or the power embedded in it, is not what concerns
us in Tayeb. Doctor–patient relationships are based precisely on the
authority of the doctor, due to his or her professional knowledge and skills.
This hierarchy is there because we intend it to be. Patients routinely rely on
it when they follow a doctor’s prescription or listen to his advice,
“surrendering” their own judgment to that of a professional. The problem in
Tayeb and similar situations is that the doctor extended the power that was
originally granted for professional purposes to a strictly non-professional
domain. This extension or overstepping is what the Court considered to be
wrong and abusive toward the patient–complainant. I term this extended
influence charisma of the office.170
Tayeb relied on the kind of influence that is typical of authority
relations, which works neither through force nor through coercion. This
type of influence makes people follow the guidance and direction of a
168

Id. at 306.
ARENDT, supra note 126, at 93.
170
This expression is borrowed from Weber, although I attach a different meaning to it
and employ it in a different context, to serve my own purpose in interpreting SAR offenses.
For Weber’s concept of charisma of the office, see WEBER, supra note 123, at 248.
169
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person of authority with no external means of coercion. Normally, this type
of domination is available to people by virtue of their professional status
and is used—and is expected to be used—only within their professional
domain and only for professional purposes. Tayeb, however, extended it to
sex. The complainant’s submission was due to a residue, extension, or halo
of the credited influence of the authority that Tayeb possessed as a
therapist. I chose the term charisma because of the subtle and hard-todefine nature of this influence. A “halo” or “residue” is much closer to the
aura of charisma than it is to a physical power.
Yet charisma usually signifies a positive attribute—a gift that some
have that allows them to lead and inspire others. Like personal charisma,
charisma of the office leads people into action. Unlike personal charisma,
however, charisma of the office is not due to a charming or extraordinary
personality, but rather originates from a professional position of power. It
is, in fact, an extension of the authority that was originally accorded as part
of their professional position—as part of their office—that continues even
outside the professional domain. It is thus a charisma deriving from an
office. I argue that Tayeb was punished for using charisma of the office to
induce sexual submission. This conception of wrongdoing underlies
additional SAR cases and designates SAR as a legal category.
In sum, Tayeb extended and misused his power as an authority figure.
Tayeb, like any therapist, had physical access and proximity to the
complainant on the treatment bed; yet he did not use physical coercion.
Tayeb, like other therapists, possessed knowledge and expertise vital to the
complainant’s wellbeing; however, he did not “bargain” his professional
expertise for sexual favors. Moreover, he did not use fraud. His offense was
not achieved through lies or misrepresentation—the complainant did not for
one minute think that sex was part of the therapeutic session. Otherwise,
she would not have been so deeply puzzled in her later testimony by her
inability to resist Tayeb and would instead have attributed her submission to
being mistaken or misinformed. Tayeb did not commit an offense according
to any traditional category of violation of autonomy. What he did was use
(or abuse) the charisma of the office—the extended power that he benefited
from based upon his professional office, which he used wrongfully in an
arena completely outside of his professional realm.
3. What Is Wrong with Sex in Authority Relations
What remains to be explained is why the dynamic of Tayeb is not
exceptional and why it is endemic to modern society. This pervasive
behavior has consequently given rise to SAR offenses and ultimately to the
need for their justification. At first, this type of offense may seem alien to
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modern bureaucracies. After all, the separation of spheres and the clear
demarcation of bureaucratic authority is inherent to the logic of modern life.
However, SAR offenses acknowledge the gap between the Weberian ideal
of bureaucratic authority and its actualization in real life. Under the
Weberian ideal, SAR abuse would be impossible: officeholders would
know and accept the limits of their authority and subordinates would
ascribe power to officeholders only within the realm of their competencies.
In everyday life, people may find it difficult to act upon the artificial divide
between the spheres. The outcome is the charismatic extension of power
from the bureaucratic sphere to the personal sphere. This charismatic
extension of power is the heart of the problem to which SAR regulation
responds.
The separation between professional and personal is not always
problematic. The two spheres can lead a parallel existence as long as one
has professional relationships with some people and private relationships
with others. The spheres peacefully coexist, each under its own separate
logic. Fundamentally, this parallel existence is obliterated when two people,
who adhere to a professional hierarchy within the sphere of office, add sex,
an intimate activity par excellence, to their relations. As noted in Falah,171
an Israeli Supreme Court decision dealing with sexual abuse by a
psychologist, in these instances the distinction between professional
treatment and personal lovemaking becomes blurred,172 and the parties enter
the “twilight zone” of therapy interwoven with romance.173 Criminal law
(through SAR offenses) assumes that whenever sex is initiated between two
people who, concurrently with their sexual liaison, also have a professional
association, it may lead to a particular type of exploitation resulting from
the lack of distinction between professional and private life. The distinction
between the spheres is not problematic when the parties are clearly in either
one or the other: when the doctor gives medical advice, the sides are clearly
in the sphere of office; when doctor and patient meet in the theater, they are
clearly in the private sphere. The confusing cases are those in the middle,
especially if sex is initiated by an authority figure in “the office,” the
physical space designated for professional activity.
On any strictly rational account, sexual matters are outside the scope
of authority of teachers, workplace supervisors, or of therapists. On a purely
informational level, subordinates know this well. Nevertheless, SAR
offenses assume subordinates may find it difficult or even impossible to
171
172
173

CrimA 7024/93 Eli Falah v. State of Israel 49(1) PD 2 [1995].
Id. at 37.
Id. at 24.
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maintain the separation between the two spheres. Criminal law assumes
that, in everyday life, subordinates find it hard to act upon the rational
assumption that the person standing in front of them asking for sex is
operating in his capacity as a private person and should be acknowledged as
their equal rather than an authority figure. Instead, they tend to submit to
such sexual requests or to feel as if they are not in a position to refuse them.
At the moment of truth, they tend to perceive the authority figure as
holistically powerful rather than merely professionally authorized, and
certain officeholders on their part take advantage of this tendency and
manipulate subordinates into having unwanted sex.
III. NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS
SAR offenses acknowledge a distinct wrong: the charismatic
overstepping of authority from the bureaucratic sphere into the intimate
sphere. This conceptual analysis has clear normative implications on the
regulation of SAR offenses. Other conceptualizations of the wrong—e.g.,
liberal and feminist—lead to different, mistaken, regulatory arrangements.
The following Part proposes a new regulation, based on the
conceptualization presented above. The following discussion is not a
comprehensive model for a new regulation but rather an outline of the
normative implications of this Article’s analysis.
The most important normative consequence of the new
conceptualization is recognizing that SAR should be regulated as a new
type of abuse of authority under a regulatory criminal model and not as a
sex offense or as a core criminal offense. Consequently, SAR offenses
should be punished less severely than traditional sex offenses (which are
core offenses). Secondly, the new conceptualization of SAR allows for a
more precise definition of the elements of the offense: the actus reus of
SAR should include abuse of authority and not nonconsent, and the legal
inquiry should focus on the offender’s misconduct and not on the subjective
state of mind of the victim.
A. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE TYPE OF REGULATION

Thus far, criminalization of SAR was justified either through liberal or
through feminist premises. This has had detrimental consequences on SAR
regulation. Liberals equate SAR with a breach of sexual autonomy.
Consequently, they consider SAR offenses as sex offenses and as “true
crimes,” i.e., analogous to other sex offenses such as rape and sexual
assault.174 In the event a breach was not proven, SAR offenders were
174

Schulhofer, for example, supports the criminalization of sex within mental therapy
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altogether exempted from criminal sanctions. The feminist account
criminalizes SAR offenses as gender exploitation of power. Feminists, like
liberals, do not distinguish between SAR and other sex offenses and
consequently advocate for its severe punishment—on the same scale as
other sex offenses.
While both liberals and feminists conceive of SAR under the general
category of sex offenses and take authority relations as a subcategory, SAR
is better placed under the general category of abuse of authority, with
sexual relations as a subcategory. Criminal law has traditionally proscribed
abuse of authority, but the prohibition was limited to the abuse of public
authority.175 SAR offenses engage a different type of authority—
bureaucratic authority—and seek to prevent its charismatic abuse. Thus
conceived, SAR should be perceived as an expansion of traditional abuse of
authority offenses,176 rather than an expansion of sexual assault offenses.
The most important consequence of the new conceptualization is
recognizing that SAR offenses should be classified and treated as regulatory
offenses and not as core criminal offenses. The distinction between core
offenses and regulatory offenses is central to modern criminal law and
criminal legal theory.177 Core crimes carry severe criminal punishment
(typically imprisonment) and require proof of subjective fault (mens rea) by
the offender. Regulatory offenses are punishable by low levels of
punishment (typically fines) and satisfied with proof of negligence or an
even lower mens rea. Two main categories comprise core crimes: violation
of individual autonomy (e.g., murder and theft) and crimes against public
relationships as “sexual abuse”—a felony of the third degree under a comprehensive code
for the criminalization of sex offenses. SCHULHOFER, supra note 49, at 283–84.
175
For a useful introduction of abuse-of-office offenses in criminal law, including
official oppression, common law extortion, malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance in
office, see ROLLIN M. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 483–92 (2d ed. 1969). For a thorough
consideration of official extortion offenses under contemporary American law, see James
Lindgren, The Theory, History, and Practice of the Bribery–Extortion Distinction, 141 U.
PA. L. REV. 1695 (1993).
176
In recent decades, there has been a growing tendency to criminalize nongovernmental
corruption—for example, commercial bribery. For a classic piece on the criminalization of
nongovernmental corruption, see Note, Control of Nongovernmental Corruption by Criminal
Legislation, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 848 (1960). For a detailed account of the analogy between
SAR offenses and traditional abuse-of-office offenses in criminal law, see Schneebaum,
supra note 18, at 119–37.
177
For a thorough consideration of the distinction between crimes and regulatory
offenses, see ALAN BRUDNER, PUNISHMENT AND FREEDOM 169–73 (2009). For a classic piece
depicting the emergence of regulatory offenses since the nineteenth century, see Francis
Bowes Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 55 (1933). In particular, the
article associates the introduction of regulatory offenses with modernization (most notably
technological development and urbanization).
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legal authority and order (e.g., treason and bribery).178 SAR falls in neither
of the two categories, as SAR offenses are neither concerned with personal
autonomy nor public legal authority, but rather with bureaucratic authority.
Nevertheless, SAR is a legal wrong that should be criminalized, albeit to a
lesser extent.
Regulatory offenses address wrongdoings against the general welfare
and are a justified instrument to prevent harm to society as a whole, as well
as to unspecified groups of individuals.179 Legally, these offenses do not
focus on particular victims and in fact might not have a victim at all. These
offenses protect less essential public interests and consequently are not
punished with the same severity as a core offense. The best analogies to
SAR are other offenses that regulate public or semipublic spaces (such as
the workplace, the environment, industries, and others). Thus conceived,
SAR regulates the bureaucratic environment and not the rights of individual
victims. It seeks to prevent harm to individuals but does not vindicate the
violation of individual autonomy. It only protects individuals as long as
they are in a bureaucratic environment and only from the abuse of
bureaucratic authority. It also attempts to enable the coexistence of personal
and professional relationships in a bureaucratic environment. Under this
account, SAR is not concerned with the general protection of socially
disadvantaged groups from discrimination, but rather with the prevention of
abuse of authority. SAR, moreover, is distinguishable from professional
ethics to the extent that the latter protects the integrity of the profession and
office, independent of any negative effect on individuals. The aim of SAR
offenses is neither to protect the subordinate as a victim nor the professional
standard of the officeholder, but rather to protect the space, the
environment, and the relationship between the two.
B. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE DOCTRINE

In addition to reconsidering the severity of SAR crimes and
punishment, several other normative and doctrinal consequences follow
from its new conceptualization. First, the central element of SAR is the

178

See generally ANDREW ASHWORTH, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 29 (6th ed. 2009)
(distinguishing between crimes against individual autonomy and core crimes against the
community as a whole).
179
Brudner thus observes that regulatory offenses punish for acts that do not involve a
domination of the free will of individual victims. ALAN BRUDNER, THE UNITY OF THE
COMMON LAW 215 (1995) (“[O]ne may incur penalties for acts that do not dominate the free
will of others, either because (as in the case of a breach of a safety regulation) they involve
no transaction with another person or because (as in the case of trafficking in narcotics) the
transaction is consensual.”).
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abuse of authority and not the lack of consent. Contrary to liberal accounts
of SAR offenses, which require proof of the victim’s nonconsent,180 the
proposed conceptualization assumes victim consent and requires proof of
the offender’s abuse of authority.
Secondly, the presence of authority alone is not enough—there needs
to be an abuse of authority. The mere coexistence of sexual relations and
authority relations is insufficient to warrant criminal punishment. What we
are looking for, instead, is to identify and proscribe sexual acts performed
under the influence of official power and thus in abuse thereof. It is possible
to think of sexual contact between an officeholder and a subordinate, which
is not procured through the undue diversion of official power from the
professional to the private sphere. For example, a dentist who meets a
patient at a dinner party thrown by a mutual friend and asks her for a date,
which is later followed by a sexual affair, surely has not committed a
criminal offense. The distinction between abusive and nonabusive sex in
these contexts is not easy. Naturally, some cases are more difficult to decide
than others, but there are clear cases on each end of the spectrum. Abuse of
authority is, in any case, the guiding concept to distinguish among them and
to define the limits of criminality. It follows that existing SAR provisions
that are phrased as per se prohibitions—i.e., that categorically proscribe all
sex in authority relations without requiring an additional element of
abuse—may be acknowledged as instances of overcriminalization.
Following these principles, a new and more precise legal definition of
the offense can be derived from the new conceptualization. To recall, the
offense was defined as abuse of authority, and specifically, the abuse of the
charismatic authority of office. This definition entails the following
doctrinal elements:
Authority: The offender holds bureaucratic authority. This definition
excludes other forms of authority: charismatic authority (e.g., a rock star) as
well as state authority (e.g., a police officer). It, however, includes

180
In their attempt to interpret SAR provisions, courts have read an element of
nonconsent into the offense even if the official definition did not include nonconsent. See,
e.g., Scadden v. State, 732 P.2d 1036, 1040–41 (Wyo. 1987) (“In the exercise of its
governmental police power, the legislature has thrown out the protecting arm of the law to
guard those persons who are vulnerable to the powers and influence of one in a position of
authority. This legislative act permits the State to show that the victim did not consent, by
demonstrating that the perpetrator occupied a position of authority over the victim and used
that position to impose his sexual will.”). I argue that this interpretation is misguided and
that SAR offenses should not include an element of sexual nonconsent, but rather should
focus on abuse of authority.
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professional bureaucrats (e.g., a post office manager) and authority figures
in other institutional contexts (e.g., a member of the clergy).181
Authority Relations: The offender is an officeholder who has effective
authority over the victim within the sphere of bureaucratic competency
(employer over an employee; doctor over a patient).
Abuse of Authority: The offender uses his authority to achieve an
objective that does not belong to the bureaucratic sphere. The paradigmatic
case of abuse of authority is charismatic abuse of bureaucratic authority.
Extortionate threats182 and false claims by an officeholder should be
covered by the offense as clear cases of abuse of authority. They are,
however, less typical. In addition, extortionate and fraudulent cases
constitute sexual nonconsent and may be covered by sex offense provisions,
to the extent that such provisions cover sexual extortion and fraudulent sex.
To conclude, extortionate threats and false claims are the only SAR cases
that may be criminalized both as sex offenses and as abuse of bureaucratic
authority.
Abuse of Charisma of the Office: An essential component of the
offense is proving that an authority overstepped the boundaries between the
bureaucratic and the intimate spheres. A sexual relationship may be one
paradigm but does not exhaust the range of proscribed conduct. Nonsexual
intimacy that manipulates the charisma of office may also constitute an
offense. In adjudicating SAR cases, courts need to assess the extent to
which the line between the personal and professional sphere is blurred. The
following elements are not conclusive in determining abuse, but
considering them would be helpful in deciding the case:
(1) Where did the sexual encounter take place? An officeholder who
initiates sexual contact in the physical space of bureaucratic
authority—the office, the university, the clinic—effectively plays on
the blurred line between the bureaucratic sphere and the personal
sphere. Hence, a sexual affair taking place in the office or clinic (or
initiated in these locations) is more suspect than a sexual encounter
taking place in a nonoffice location, such as a bar, after working hours.

181

Regulators of SAR offenses have come up with more elaborate and, for the most part,
satisfying demarcations of bureaucratic authority. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-919(a)
(2004).
182
An interesting question arises as to offers as opposed to threats in this context. While
traditional criminal law standards distinguish between threats and offers and between
coercion and bargain, an abuse-of-authority model may support the criminalization of offers
by bureaucratic authority as well. The present Article focuses on charismatic abuse of
bureaucratic authority, where neither threats nor offers are present. Thus, a full development
of the argument regarding coercive offers is outside this Article’s scope.
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(2) Who initiated the sexual act? Since the offense seeks to prevent the
overstepping of bureaucratic authority, we are mostly concerned with
cases where the authority figure was the initiating party.
(3) How active was the authority figure in transferring his professional
power to the personal sphere? Aggressive or persistent sexual
requirements presented by an officeholder are more suspect than a
single offer.183
CONCLUSION
More and more jurisdictions have criminalized or are in the process of
adopting legislation prohibiting SAR. Feminists and liberals alike support
such prohibitions and share a strong sense that SAR is often wrongful and
abusive. But while the sense of moral wrong is apparent, its legal
foundations are uncertain. This Article suggests a new theory and a new
justification for SAR criminalization, which carries both conceptual and
normative implications.
As this Article shows, threats are not the ground for the criminalization
of SAR offenses. Instead, new statutory definitions use “abuse of authority”
(rather than extortion); courts employ a “totality of the circumstances” test
to adjudicate SAR cases; and legal scholarship acknowledges the
shortcomings of extortion theory for SAR offenses.
Feminists have been correct to identify the limitations of standard
liberal theory with respect to SAR offenses. The theory of authority
relations suggested here, while based on different premises, shares an
important point with feminist thought and methodology: it looks beyond the
liberal portrayal of individuals as autonomous actors and incorporates social
theory in order to account for the social structure in which SAR offenses
take place. Unlike feminism, however, the suggested theory focuses on
authority rather than on male power and develops a theory of abuse of
authority, rather than power domination.
The concept of abuse of authority is not foreign to criminal law.
However, the traditional criminalization of authority has been limited in the
common law tradition to governmental authority and the misconduct of
public officials. SAR offenses apply to a different type of authority—
bureaucratic authority—that is present in private sphere institutions and

183

Buchhandler-Raphael similarly stresses the persistence of sexual advances by an
authority figure as an important indication for criminal abuse. See Buchhandler-Raphael,
supra note 53, at 484. Buchhandler-Raphael, however, considers this parameter as part of an
abuse-of-power model, which includes economic and professional power, rather than an
abuse-of-authority model. Buchhandler-Raphael, supra note 112, at 133.
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relationships whenever people are granted power by virtue of their
profession or place in the hierarchy of an organization.
SAR offenses, as we have seen, identify a new potential for abuse that
emerges in bureaucratic arenas. While bureaucratic authority is supposed to
be demarcated and apply to professional matters only, authority figures in
effect are able to extend their charisma of office to nonprofessional matters.
SAR statutes are particularly troubled by the overstepping of power from
the bureaucratic sphere to the personal sphere and criminalize sex in
authority relations as a novel type of abuse of authority.
Understood in this way, SAR offenses should not be construed as
introducing a new conception of legal autonomy. These offenses do not
modify the legal standard of sexual nonconsent, but rather apply to
consensual sexual relations that are nevertheless wrongful because the
offender misuses his position of bureaucratic authority. Criminal law does
not assume that sex is—or should be—free from any type of social power
or charisma, hence personal charisma (e.g., the charisma of a rock star
soliciting a woman into sexual involvement) is not covered by SAR
offenses. SAR offenses are concerned particularly with the coexistence of
personal and professional relationships and the overstepping of bureaucratic
charisma into the sphere of intimacy and sex.
Modern society faces a new kind of challenge in the age of
bureaucracy. While we strive for freedom, our ambition cannot be and
should not be to eliminate bureaucratic domination. While we strive for
equality in our personal lives, we require hierarchy in our professional lives
and in our institutions. As Weber explains, bureaucracy offers great
advantages in terms of efficiency and productivity and is indispensable to
modern life. This is not to assume that these boundaries are “natural” or
even easily maintainable. It is precisely their ambiguous nature and
fluctuating borders that give rise to SAR offenses. Our challenge is to limit
bureaucratic rule and to prevent the overstepping of boundaries that might
turn bureaucratic domination into an unacceptable status relationship. This
Article suggests that SAR offenses are concerned with an instance of this
challenge. It reflects an understanding of the problem we face not as a
problem of coercion (as liberals would have it), but of abuse. Not as a
problem of eliminating power relations (as some feminists would have it),
but rather one of restraining power and keeping it within limits.
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